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For generations, the United States of America has played a unique 
role as an anchor of global security and advocate for human freedom. 
Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are naturally re-
luctant to use force to solve the world's many challenges. But when 
our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act. 
-Barack Obama, March 28, 2011 (justifying the NATO intervention 
in Libya).
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary events in the Arab world should cause us to wonder 
what happened to our commitment to the democratic revolution. Ameri-
ca’s understanding of its own role in supporting democratic orders is, as 
a result of the so-called Arab Spring, as confused as it has ever been. I 
hope in these few pages to expound upon these ideas of democractic 
commitments and their consequences, which must command greater con-
sideration.  
In particular, I want to explore a central irony in our times concern-
ing the externally imposed democratic revolution.
2
 On the one hand, 
many of us across the entire American political spectrum adhere to the 
principle of democratic rule as core normative commitment.
3
 We believe 
in a moral conception of government wherein authority may only derive 
its powers from the consent of the governed, a principle reflected in two 
cornerstone and foundational documents that conceptualized human 
rights in modernity—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 and 
  
 † Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
 1. Ben Feller, Obama Libya Speech Strongly Defends Intervention, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 28, 2011, 8:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/28/obama-libya-speech-
_n_841311.html#text (for the full text of the speech, follow the hyperlink at the end of the article). 
 2. I should note at the outset that I borrow the term “externally imposed revolution” from 
Andrew Arato’s commendable work on the Iraq Constitution. ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION 
MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 1 (2009).  
 3. Again, President Obama’s speech justifying the Libya intervention is instructive. While 
offering a litany of reasons as to why humanitarian intervention was justified, in a manner described 
more fully in Part IV hereof, the President made an implicit reference to something akin to a “dom-
ino theory” of tyranny that offered a robust commitment to support the democratic “impulses” that 
had to that time convulsed the Arab world. See Feller, supra note 1. 
 4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of gov-
ernment; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”). 
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the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.
5
 On the other 
hand, there seems to be a broad consensus that views forcible regime 
change of tyrannies into regimes of democratic rule as a per se illegiti-
mate interference into the affairs of other nations, a position likewise 
conceptualized as foundational in the United Nations Charter.
6
 Where 
our praise for democracy is nearly universal, and there is no end to the 
laudations we are willing to heap upon citizens who are willing to sacri-
fice their lives and their freedom in its name in their own tyrannical 
states,
7
 we grow timid when asked to bear similar burdens abroad. We 
are worried that somehow to do so would be to engage in “unsupervised 
meddling in the processes of choice within other states,”8 and that it 
would therefore lack popular legitimacy.  
The distinction as between our professed faith in democracy and our 
almost politically correct unwillingness to “impose” it on other states is 
remarkable, and in some ways conceptually difficult to support. For if a 
people are the true foundation of the legitimacy of its government, then 
by what right, and under what conception, could it possibly be that for-
eign intervention to remove a tyrant and restore to the people their natu-
ral right to rule themselves be itself denied legitimacy? How can the le-
gitimacy of the state be judged as against the authority granted to it by its 
people on the one hand, and by the position of a despot supported by no 
such authority on the other? How can any reasonable person who takes 
her normative commitment to democracy seriously claim that in a con-
flict between a foreign invader committed to restoring democratic rule 
and an unspeakable tyrant committed to denying it, legitimacy to rule lies 
necessarily, ipso facto, with the tyrant by virtue of nothing other than 
nationality? The irony is particularly disturbing when the repression is 
itself foreign, albeit undertaken at the request of the tyrant. That is to say, 
somehow there is international legitimacy in Saudi Arabia providing 
troops at the Bahraini tyrant’s request in order to repress a popular upris-
ing.
9
 Illegitimacy would have ensued only if a nation somehow inter-
vened to support the Bahraini people against a remorseless tyrannical 
monarchical family utterly lacking in the most basic understandings of 
  
 5. International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, art. 25, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) (“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportuni-
ty, . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections 
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors . . . .”). 
 6. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the threat or use of force against the political 
independence or territorial sovereignty of member states). 
 7. For a recent noteworthy example relating to the Arab Spring in particular, see Nicholas D. 
Kristof, Release My Friend!, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A27. 
 8. W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 
89 (2003).     
 9. See Ethan Bronner & Michael Slackman, Saudis, Fearful of Iran, Send Troops to Bahrain 
to Quell Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2011, at A1 (describing the entry of Saudi troops into Bah-
rain at the Bahraini monarch’s request for the purposes of suppressing a popular uprising). 
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decency, let alone tolerance.
10
 To the committed democrat, something is 
amiss under such a conception.  
We strain hard to find our ways out of this morass of respect for 
sovereignty on the one hand and commitment to democracy on the other. 
We search for any plausible reason, no matter how irrelevant or beside 
the point, to justify intervention to institute democratic rule. In other 
words, at times we seek to institute democratic rule, but we look for a 
different reason to justify our action. It is as if the democratic commit-
ment in such matters is something to be embarrassed by rather than to be 
proud of.  
The most popular form of indirect legitimation of democratic inter-
vention involves hinging the regime change to some other, more recog-
nized form of international interference with sovereignty. Most notably, 
it is legitimate, experts maintain, to engage in regime change in particu-
lar circumstances where there was a preexisting reason to initiate war in 
the first place, as in Japan after the Second World War, or Afghanistan 
following the events of September 11, 2001.
11
 While such sorts of inter-
  
 10. The outrages committed by the Bahraini government against its own people are well 
documented by respected human rights organizations and are described to some extent later in this 
Article. Such outrages include systematic attacks on those who provided medical care to protestors, 
as well as the injured protestors themselves, Bahrain: Systematic Attacks on Medical Providers, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 18, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/18/bahrain-systematic-
attacks-medical-providers; dismissals of workers and expulsions of students for participating in pro-
democracy rallies, Bahrain: Revoke Summary Firings Linked to Protests, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 
14, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/14/bahrain-revoke-summary-firings-linked-protests; 
the killing of dozens of protestors engaged in peaceful protests, including a 14-year-old boy, Teen-
age Activist Killed in Bahrain Protest, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/teenage-activist-killed-bahrain-protest-2011-08-31; 
and the prosecution of teachers by military tribunal, Teachers to Be Tried By a Military Court, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ 
MDE11/043/2011/en/dd5fd1ea-a1de-406c-b69b-f56328aaf5a0/mde110432011en.pdf. Such inci-
dents have continued unabated long after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, often meeting 
with denials on the part of the Bahraini authorities that border on the farcical. Hence, for example, at 
the end of January, 2012, a nineteen year old opposition figure was arrested and died while in police 
custody, after being allegedly run over by a police car. The Bahraini government claims he was 
never injured by the police, and in fact died of “natural causes”; specifically, sickle cell anemia. 
CNN Wire Staff, 4 Killed in Protests in Bahrain, Opposition Group Says, CNN, (Jan. 27, 2012, 
12:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/27/world/meast/bahrain-unrest/index.html?iref=allsearch. 
In addition, the Bahraini government commissioned a group of experts, led by the well-respected M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate complaints about human rights abuses committed during the height 
of the uprising in February and March of 2011. That report, despite its being commissioned by the 
Bahraini monarch, contains devastating allegations respecting police misconduct and broad human 
rights abuses. See BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE BAHRAIN 
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (2011), http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf. These are 
but a fraction of the reported incidents of gross human rights violations designed to impede demo-
cratic rule. For further details on these and other matters, see the websites of both Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch. 
 11. Citing the example of Kosovo, the inestimable public international law scholar Michael 
Reisman indicates that “regime change may be internationally lawful when it is the contextually 
appropriate instrument of an intrinsically lawful action.” Reisman, supra note 8, at 89 (emphasis in 
original); see also ARATO, supra note 2, at 34 (pointing out that one distinction as between Germany 
and Japan after the Second World War on the one hand and Iraq on the other was that the former two 
states were the aggressors in their respective conflicts). 
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vention have a long and storied modern history, from Germany
12
 and 
Japan to Cambodia
13
 and Uganda,
14
 the potential for their use has grown 
exponentially as a new (to date, still controversial) basis for intervention 
into the affairs of sovereign states has arisen. This is the “responsibility 
to protect,” designed to prevent future humanitarian catastrophes that 
resemble the Rwandan genocide of 1994.
15
 Indeed, in contemporary Lib-
ya it was precisely this doctrine, and the concomitant endorsement of the 
principle by the Security Council,
16
 that President Obama and NATO 
made use of to initiate hostilities against Qaddafi’s regime.17  
Yet this approach raises its own concerns, in the first place because 
of the obvious opportunity for doublespeak it affords. The Security 
Council Resolution that authorized force against Libya quite evidently 
did not authorize regime change in favor of democratic rule and against 
brutal tyranny.
18
 Yet it is difficult to maintain that NATO’s bombing 
campaign was designed (at least beyond its earliest stages) to protect 
civilians from a humanitarian catastrophe rather than to remove a global-
ly despised tyrant who had rendered his nation a caricature and replace 
his regime with a democratic government.
19
 If NATO is permitted to 
  
 12. The reference here, of course, is to the well-known occupation of Germany following the 
Second World War. PETER H. MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC 6 (1963). 
 13. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to put an end to the Khmer Rouge regime, which had 
in four years caused 1.7 million deaths. BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND 
GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975–79, at 450–52 (3d ed. 2008); Khmer 
Rouge, Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations 
/k/khmer_rouge/index.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2011). 
 14. After various border clashes, Tanzania invaded Uganda to end the horrific rule of Idi 
Amin, whose human rights violations, including the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians, 
were legendary. TONY AVIRGAN & MARTHA HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA: THE LEGACY OF IDI AMIN 
76 (1982). 
 15. Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: 
Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 191, 191–94 (2008). 
 16. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 17. Obama’s principal reliance on a responsibility to protect was unambiguous. Feller, supra 
note 1 (“Gaddafi declared that he would show ‘no mercy’ to his own people. He compared them to 
rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we had seen him hang 
civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day. Now, we saw regime forces 
on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi—a city nearly the 
size of Charlotte—could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and 
stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our national interest to let that happen. I refused to 
let that happen. And so nine days ago, after consulting the bipartisan leadership of Congress, I au-
thorized military action to stop the killing and enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973.”). 
 18. Security Council Resolution 1973 in fact only authorizes force “to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, 
while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” S.C. Res. 
1973, supra note 16, ¶ 4. 
 19. This matter, respecting the extent to which NATO was more engaged in regime change 
than it was in protecting civilians, at least beyond its initial stages, is the subject of Part IV. It suffic-
es to note for now, however, that the seeming disjunction between NATO’s stated aims of humani-
tarian intervention and its apparent, ultimate objective of regime change was not a matter that went 
without comment in the popular media. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Libya’s Dark Lesson for NATO, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SR4 (“More than six budget-busting months against one of the weakest 
militaries in the world, with shortages of planes, weapons and ammunition that were patched over by 
the pretense that NATO was acting simply to ‘protect civilians,’ when it was clear to everyone that 
the alliance was intervening on one side of a civil war . . . .”). 
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clothe its regime change efforts under the dubious pretext of responsibil-
ity to protect, this merely privileges the next international actor seeking 
pretext to engage in regime change to do the same. This may be well and 
good to the extent that such interventions are humanitarian efforts to 
institute democratic rule, but when undertaken for more nefarious pur-
poses (acquisition of territory, intimidation of weaker neighbor, creation 
of a pliable client state), the problems with doublespeak and pretext in 
undertaking intervention become quite apparent.  
Moreover, even if regime change could be justified as a means to 
vindicate some other recognized principle of international law and rela-
tions, it is difficult to see how the imposition of democratic rule once 
regime change was undertaken could be similarly justified. Nothing in 
the Hague Convention grants the right to an occupier, justified or not in 
its occupation, to institute democratic reform.
20
 Thus, resistance to such 
reforms by even small numbers of post conflict elites would render such 
reforms potentially suspect. Indeed by the standard of the Hague Con-
vention, it was the Japanese Matsumoto Commission and not the United 
States that had the better legal argument respecting the nature of the con-
stitutional change to which Japan should be subjected.
21
  
The essential problem therefore remains—we believe in democracy, 
and we seek to spread it, but are desperate to deny ourselves any right to 
do so, engaging in any manner of subversion or deception to mask our 
true intentions, as if we were in such ventures truly out to steal oil rather 
than help to fulfill what we believe to be legitimate national aspirations 
of other peoples.  
While perhaps longstanding, this confusion respecting the role of 
external powers in fomenting or supporting a domestic democratic revo-
lution reached something of a crisis point with the eruption of the Arab 
Spring. In state after Arab state, from Morocco in the west
22
 to Bahrain
23
 
  
 20. In fact, the Hague Convention IV prohibits an occupier from making any change to the 
laws in force in the territory occupied “unless absolutely prevented.” Convention Between the Unit-
ed States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]. 
 21. Shortly after the war, a panel of senior Japanese legal scholars proposed a draft constitu-
tion that bore a very close resemblance to Japan’s historic Meiji Constitution, effectively retaining 
the general legal and political regime of the state as it had long existed. RAY A. MOORE & DONALD 
L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER 
MACARTHUR 74 (2002). It was the United States that objected, drafting an alternative, radically 
different Constitution in a matter of days and insisting on its enactment in the place of the Meiji 
Constitution. Id. at 106–08. By any reasonable standpoint, the United States had not adhered to the 
terms of the Hague Convention IV in demanding such a radical change, in favor of liberal democra-
cy, to territory under its occupation. 
 22. Max Fisher, Will Morocco Be the Arab Spring’s Next Greatest Success—or Great Fail-
ure?, THE ATLANTIC (July 1, 2011, 6:59 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/will-morocco-be-the-arab-springs-great-
success-or-great-failure/241286/. 
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and Yemen in the east,
24
 millions of protestors crowded the Arab streets, 
demanding in most cases regime change, and this on the most basic of 
democratic principles—because, to cite the familiar refrain heard by the-
se brave demonstrators, “the people want the fall of the regime.”25 The 
demand deserves emphasis. That these convulsions were self-evidently 
democratic in spirit is demonstrated by that near uniform refrain, origi-
nating in Tunisia and widely popularized in Egypt’s Tahrir Square, re-
specting “the people’s” demand.26 The claim was neither that Mubarak 
had transgressed against God, nor that Asad had failed to uphold the 
principles of shari’a, but rather that the people had chosen to strip their 
respective regimes of legitimacy, and that was enough. Learned scholars 
had long told us that in this region law divorced from Islam would have 
no legitimacy—that the only legal rules that could function would be 
those believed to be from God.
27
 Yet political legitimacy was being lo-
  
 23. Cynthia Johnston, Bahrain Seeks Calm, Opposition Demands Constitution, REUTERS 
(Feb. 16, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/16/us-bahrain-
idUSTRE71E7FS20110216.  
 24. Cynthia Johnston & Frederick Richter, Old Guard Fights Back Across Region: Protesters 
in Bahrain to Bury Their Dead Friday After Protests Against Sunni-Minority Monarchy, EDMONTON 
J., (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=e1f91032-c121-
4c23-8a26-c6a6ffab0c90&p=1.  
 25. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The PEOPLE Want the Fall of the Regime, ISLAMIC LAW IN OUR 
TIMES: OR FOAM FROM A CAMEL’S MOUTH, SPEWING AND SUBSIDING (July 26, 2011, 1:37 PM), 
http://muslimlawprof.org/2011/07/26/the-people-want-the-fall-of-the-regime-and-norwegian-
terrorism.aspx. 
 26. See Marwa Awad & Hugo Dixon, The Art of Revolution: Egypt’s Nonviolent Warriors, 
THE DAILY STAR (Apr. 14, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Apr/14/The-art-of-
revolution-Egypts-nonviolent-warriors.ashx#axzz1eTZG0g3O (describing chants in Tahrir Square); 
J. David Goodman, Tunisian Protesters Watch Mubarak Trial with Envy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 
2011, 2:03 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/tunisian-protesters-watch-mubarak-
trial-with-envy/; Hundreds Arrested in Syria Sweep: Activists, ABC NEWS (May 2, 2011, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-02/hundreds-arrested-in-syria-sweep-activists/2697630; John-
ston, supra note 23; Johnston & Richter, supra note 24; So Far, So Pretty Good: Amid Trepidation, 
the New Regime Is Making a Remarkably Hopeful Start, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, at 63. 
 27. Perhaps the most well-known and deeply respected proponents of such a theory is the 
inestimable Wael Hallaq, who indicates in a notable essay as follows: 
[A]n explanation must be provided as to the assumption underlying this question, namely, 
the posited necessity for today's Muslims to live by a religious law. Since the middle of 
the nineteenth century, Muslim societies have embarked on a course of identity crisis 
caused, among other things, by the disappearance from their daily lives of the religious 
structures that sustained them for over a millennium. One of these structures, and a cen-
tral one at that, was Islamic law as a religious and pragmatic system. To say that this law 
was "the core and kernel" of Islamic life is indeed to state the obvious. Thus, for these 
societies to regain their cultural and religious identities, a form of Islamic law must ob-
tain—and this for two good reasons. First, historically, Islamic societies have lived by a 
religious law for over twelve centuries, and what made their identities what they have al-
ways been was their possession of a particular legal phenomenon. Islam has always been 
a nomocracy. Indeed, Islamic societies and polities have throughout these centuries ex-
emplified the highest form of what a nomocracy can be. Second, it is at present incon-
ceivable that Muslims can or will want to transform their Weltanschauung into a Western 
model of rationality and secularism. They view the modernity of the West as incompati-
ble with their vision of morality and ethics, as having miserably failed in maintaining the 
social fabric and in creating a coherent worldview or a meaningful cosmology. The truth 
claims of Western reason and modernity seem diametrically oppositional and extremely 
antithetical to the Islamic ethos. The "return to Islam" that we have been witnessing since 
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cated by its masses in a different place altogether, one recognizable to 
any committed democrat—with the people. Suddenly earnest and learned 
efforts to undertake the “challenge” of finding liberal democracy 
Islamically compatible seemed to have the problem precisely back-
ward.
28
 It is the Islamist who has the challenge, who must justify recog-
nition of shari’a in a polity that as a core normative matter locates politi-
cal legitimacy not with God, but the people.
29
 America’s earlier attempts 
at democratic revolution in the region, in the form of Iraq, had not only 
led to (qualified) success,
30
 but the notion had managed to spread 
throughout the entire Arab region, to say nothing of Iran.
31
 
  
the Iranian Revolution is partly caused by this disenchantment with Western culture and 
its products. 
Wael B. Hallaq, Can the Shari’a Be Restored?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
MODERNITY 21, 42–43 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Barbara Freyer Stowasser eds., 2004). The 
Arab Spring demonstrations do considerable violence to this essentialist position respecting the 
importance of shari’a in modern Muslim societies. As is demonstrated in the main text, far from 
rejecting “the truth claims of Western reason,” these demonstrators quite self-evidently adopted truth 
claims set forth in the Declaration of Independence (respecting the right of the people to alter or 
abolish a government) and the Gettysburg Address (respecting government of, for and by the people) 
more than anything in Islamic political history. This is not to say that Arab democrats seek to repli-
cate their Western counterparts entirely and without modification, or even that, within a generally 
secular polity, some role for Islamic law might well be retained. It is to say that the notion that there 
is some starkly different political worldview at play in the Arab world is an increasingly difficult one 
to support. To the extent this is so in the Arab world, it is emphatically even truer in those Muslim 
states that have managed the transition to democratic and largely (though not necessarily entirely) 
secular political regimes tolerably well, among them Turkey and Indonesia. See Landon Thomas Jr., 
Turkey Prospers by Turning East, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A1 (describing Turkey’s rise as a 
regional economic power); Amelia H.C. Ylagan, Corporate Watch, BUS. WORLD (July 13, 2009), 
2009 WLNR 13279690 (describing the effort by Morgan Stanley to include Indonesia as one of the 
world’s rapidly developing and influential economies, on par with Brazil, China, India and Russia). 
 28. See generally KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY 
(Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004). 
 29. To be clear, the challenge to the Islamist, to justify the use of religious law and religious 
argument in a liberal democratic state, is not an insurmountable one. This is a topic that has been the 
subject of some debate between two of the greatest political philosophers of our era, Habermas and 
Rawls. Compare Jürgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 8–9 (2006) 
(arguing in favor of resort to religious argument as being compatible with liberal citizenship), with 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213 (expanded ed. 2005) (suggesting that argument must be 
grounded in “public reason” accessible to all citizens). In addition, specifically in the Islamic con-
text, Abdullahi An-Na’im has advocated a form of secular citizenship that more closely resembles 
that of Rawls than Habermas, suggesting that ideal citizens would make resort to “civic reason.” 
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF 
SHARI’A 7 (2008). In any event, it is not my purpose to contribute to this rich and enlightening 
debate, but only to point out that the core normative political commitment among those who insist 
the regime must fall because the “people” demand it is to popular democratic rule. All else, includ-
ing the use of religious law, must be justified in relation to that, and not the reverse.  
 30. Respecting the limited, but real, success of the Iraqi democratic experiment after obvious 
initial difficulties, see Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., Rebirth of a Nation, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 2010, at 
31. 
 31. Iran’s recent “Green Revolution” likewise arose because of broad suspicions that the 
results of its 2008 presidential election had been manipulated so as to ensure a victory for the con-
servative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. See Mark Tran & Julian Borger, Iran Elections: Ahmadinejad to 
be Sworn in as President by August, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2009, 7:25 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/23/iran-guardian-council-results. The protestors then 
continued to voice opposition even after the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamane’i, had urged them to 
cease. Sadegh Zibakalam, Dismissing Iran’s ‘Greens’ Is Premature, THE DAILY STAR (May 10, 
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/May/10/Dismissing-Irans-
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And yet, during the Arab Spring and throughout its continuing af-
termath, confusion has reigned respecting America’s preferred response 
to such broad vindications of its core normative values. This confusion is 
caused, to some extent, by the obfuscation respecting America’s sup-
posed “responsibility to protect” civilians against slaughter. To take the 
simplest example, if one regards the rhetoric respecting humanitarian 
intervention seriously, it remains difficult to understand precisely what to 
make of evolving attitudes toward Syria. The use of force by NATO, 
akin to that used in Libya ostensibly to protect civilians, has never been 
seriously contemplated, though Syria’s regime has killed far more civil-
ians than Qaddafi ever had an opportunity to.
32
 Yet in contrast with Lib-
ya, American policy is decidedly confused. 
On the one hand, there have been important expressions of sympa-
thy with the Syrian democrats. This is best illustrated by the remarkable 
and courageous decision of the United States Ambassador Robert Ford, 
to visit areas where protests were strong and to meet with opposition 
leaders at great risk to his own personal safety.
33
 The United States was 
also quick to express outrage and even expel diplomats when particularly 
gruesome reports of a civilian massacre appeared in the media.
34
   
Yet at the same time, the United States appears determined to work 
exclusively within the United Nations, where it is obvious that nothing 
substantive will be achieved because of continuing, well established Rus-
sian opposition.
35
 As a result, there is no talk of a no-fly zone, or a safe 
haven, or any other form of meaningful pressure. There is only, instead, a 
U.N. endorsed peace plan that is so far from being implemented that it 
bears scant resemblance to reality on the ground,
36
 and the dispatch of 
  
greens-is-premature.ashx#ixzz1crCJ2ZVq. Given the Supreme Leader’s putative role as God’s 
representative “discovered” by humanity, the refusal to heed his wishes speaks volumes respecting 
the extent to which the Iranian protesters held tightly to core democratic political commitments. See 
Haider Ala Hamoudi, A State Which Claims Its Supreme Leader Is ‘Discovered’ Has a Very Difficult 
Time Running Itself by and Through Law, THE DAILY STAR (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Law/Oct/01/A-state-which-claims-its-supreme-leader-is-discovered-
has-a-very-difficult-time-running-itself-by-and.ashx#axzz1crBX3OvO (describing the role of Su-
preme Leader as being one divinely ordained within the Iranian political system). 
 32. As of March 27, 2012, the United Nations estimated that 9000 civilians had been killed in 
the continuing Syrian assault on protestors. Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Raises 
Syria Death Toll Estimate to More than 9000, REUTERS (March 27, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/27/us-syria-toll-idUSBRE82Q0S820120327. By contrast, on 
March 10, 2011, approximately two weeks from the imposition of the “no fly zone,” CNN had 
reported that between 1,000 and 2,000 protesters in Libya had been killed. Rebel Leader Calls for 
“Immediate Action” on No-Fly Zone, CNN (Mar. 10, 2011, 5:02 AM), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/09/libya.civil.war/index.html.  
 33. David Hartwell, U.S. Ambassador to Return to Syria, GLOB. INSIGHT (Dec. 7, 2011). 
 34. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, Nations Expel Syrian Envoys: Houla Massacre Could Prove To Be 
Watershed Moment; U.S. Joins Eight Other Countries In Ousting Diplomats, ASSOC. PRESS, May 
30, 2012. 
 35. Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S.–Russia Clash on Syria Grows Louder, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 
2012, at 3.   
 36. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, Analysts: Diplomacy Failing In Syria U.N. Blames Regime for the 
Latest Round of Killings, Violence, ASSOC. PRESS, July 14, 2012. 
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corresponding toothless U.N. monitoring teams to Syria, which repeated-
ly demand the Syrian government to take action to limit civilian casual-
ties, to no discernible effect.
37
   
Meanwhile, the situation appears to drag on, and democratic reform 
within Syria seems less likely than civil war. Indeed, the International 
Committee for the Red Cross has recently declared that the conflict has 
reached the stage where it must be referred to as civil war.
38
 Precisely 
how Syria has managed to earn such broad deference from the world’s 
democracies, while Libya did not, and under what normative or legal 
conception all of this might be justified, remains a mystery. Certainly it 
appears to have nothing whatsoever to do with a responsibility to protect 
civilians from massacre.   
In Bahrain, the rhetoric is even milder notwithstanding the popular 
protests against it that convulsed the nation in February and March of 
2011,
39
 and have continued sporadically through the start of 2012, de-
manding, once again, the fall of the regime. The problem, it seems, is not 
so much that the Arab people have a problem locating legitimacy in rule 
of the people. They have risked their lives to do so. It is more that NATO 
and the United States seem to have a hard time articulating these ideals, 
exported though they are from the West, against the tyrannies that re-
press the same Arab people.  
In other words, all of this obfuscation respecting responsibilities to 
protect and the repeal of legitimacy from one state and not another sug-
gests something deeply disturbing to the democrat—namely, that legiti-
macy to rule exists for tyrants under certain geopolitical circumstances 
that have nothing to do with a constitutive conferring of that authority by 
their people. This is hardly a realization of our democratic ideals. We 
need a new formulation, one that does not bestow legitimacy upon some 
repressive tyrants and not others.  
This is not to say that the United States will realistically be engag-
ing in regime change across the globe as against undemocratic regimes. 
It is self-evident that any nation, the United States by no means an excep-
tion, will for a variety of reasons treat similarly situated nations different-
ly. Yet let us call it what it is—pragmatic and painful accommodation to 
geopolitical reality that has nothing to do with any particular tyrant’s 
legitimacy. Qaddafi had no legitimacy to rule when it became apparent 
that his people conferred no authority upon him, and this (and not some 
mythical responsibility to protect) is the reason that NATO found it justi-
fied to remove him. For strategic reasons, it may not always be expedient 
  
 37. Id. 
 38. Neil MacFarquhar, Syria Denies Attack on Civilians, in Crisis Seen as Civil War, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2012, at A6. 
 39. Joby Warrick & Michael Birnbaum, Questions as Bahrain Stifles Revolt, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 15, 2011, at A1.           
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to treat similar despots, those in Bahrain and in Syria for example, simi-
larly. We can if we must negotiate with a tyrant. Yet this is not a reason 
to deem that tyrant as possessing any sort of legitimacy to rule. When a 
Bahraini monarch calls in a foreign army to put down protesters chanting 
“the people want the fall of a regime,” let us not suggest, even by impli-
cation, that the actions of such a monarch are entitled to any sort of re-
spect on the basis of misguided notions of sovereignty. They cannot be, 
as it is no more legitimate to a democrat to deny one’s people their right 
to rule than it is legitimate to deny another people a right to rule them-
selves. Suppression of popular uprising should be no more legitimate 
than foreign invasion, even if each, from time to time, is tolerated, again 
out of geopolitical necessity. 
Put differently, if deference to Realpolitik limits our abilities, as is 
probably inevitable, at the very least it should not limit our idealistic and 
romantic normative commitments in favor of the democratic revolution-
aries. Put into concrete terms, Libya, in the end, would have gone the 
way of Bahrain had NATO chosen not to intervene in its affairs. If there 
are sound geopolitical reasons that the removal of Qaddafi proves more 
sanguine than that of Bahrain’s tyrant monarch, then so be it, but let us at 
least be honest respecting what these leaders are—unspeakable tyrants 
with not an ounce of legitimate authority to undertake the actions they 
did. The political legitimacy belongs in both cases to one and only one 
entity—the people. 
To be clear, this is not to say that all revolutions are democratic, and 
that each popular upheaval deserves the support of those committed to 
democracy. Patently, this is not true. A normative commitment to de-
mocracy as an ideal form of government is not the same as a messianic 
and near-maniacal belief in its universal appeal to everyone, everywhere 
at every time. It should be self-evident that populations overcome by 
religious fervor, or obsessed with Marxist utopias, have in the past en-
gaged in uprisings that were not premised on the principle of democratic 
rule.
40
 This is to say nothing of poorer societies where states and effec-
tive state institutions are quite weak.
41
 In such a state, the nature of na-
tional citizenship would be a difficult one to sustain among much of the 
population, let alone democratic participation in the state. To attempt 
democracy in such circumstances is a project doomed if not to failure, 
then to substantial disappointment. I do not therefore quibble with the 
proposition that one cannot effectively “impose” democracy on a state 
that does not seek it. I do contest with some force the notion that a state 
can be understood not to desire democracy merely because its institutions 
  
 40. See infra Part II.B for one such example, 1979 Iran, in detail. 
 41. Some commentators have described Yemen in this fashion. See, e.g., Ginny Hill, Yemen: 
Security and the Collapsing State, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2011, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11482963. 
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have been captured by a tyrant who has managed to effectively suppress 
his people.  
External intervention is not precisely what comes to mind when one 
speaks of a “democratic revolution.” Usually, the idea is of democratic 
revolutions of a different sort, indigenous ones. Foreign intervention, by 
contrast, is dismissed as some sort of externally provoked coup rather 
than what it has the potential to be, which is an externally supported 
democratic revolution..
42
 This is unfortunate, and in the balance of the 
Article, I hope to demonstrate that if our normative commitment to dem-
ocratic rule is as we say it is, we should not shy away from such demo-
cratic interventions (any more than we need be embarrassed by demo-
cratic revolution) but embrace them unapologetically and fervently, even 
if for tactical and strategic reasons we are obviously unable to advance 
them universally.  
Part Two sets forth the manner in which the externally imposed 
democratic regime change can and should be thought of more as a form 
of democratic revolution than externally imposed coup. Part Two further 
suggests that just as not all external impositions are illegitimate efforts to 
acquire territory or create a neighboring client-state, so all internal revo-
lutions are not necessarily democratic. A premier example of a nondem-
ocratic revolution might be 1979 Iran, which stands in stark contrast with 
the very democratic revolutions that currently convulse the Arab world 
(and have shaken Iran in the recent past). Part Three of this Article out-
lines an alternative vision, one which rescues the democratic revolution 
more fully, and clarifies the role of external agency in bringing it about. 
Part Three also lays out how these ideas more fully conform to American 
ideals in the context of the Arab Spring. Part Four, through the example 
of Libya, demonstrates that in many ways the vision laid out herein is 
already largely American policy. As a result, what is currently required is 
not a fundamental reworking of American commitments and its actions 
in relation thereto so much as a more honest expression of what those 
commitments are, and their relationship to the externally imposed demo-
cratic revolution. 
II. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
A. Coups, Revolutions, Reforms and the Democratic Transformation of 
the State 
Perhaps it is best to begin by attempting to characterize precisely 
what it is that is happening in the Arab world through the Arab Spring. 
One possibility that can be immediately dismissed is to describe the re-
cent events as being a series of coups. 
  
 42. See Reisman, supra note 8, at 89. 
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A conventional definition of a “coup” tends to involve the following 
elements: (1) a very quick transformation over a matter of days, (2) nec-
essarily entailing violence, (3) in which the leaders of the state are re-
placed by other leaders, (4) involving a small number of individuals with 
some measure of political power, and (5) motivated by greed.
43
 Coups 
are also most often taken in secret and therefore lack any sort of public 
accountability.
44
 So defined and so understood, coups almost surely are 
not grounded in any sense of popular legitimacy and would be problem-
atic to any committed democrat. 
Quite plainly, the events of the Arab Spring do not come close to 
fitting this model. In fact, there is not a single criterion among those 
above that would apply to the Arab Spring uprisings. Some of the criteria 
are absolutely not met—for example, the transformation in Libya took 
more than six months.
45
 The notion that most of the other criteria have 
been met could only be described as risible in its inaccuracy. These pro-
tests that led to the fall of the respective regimes were not just grounded 
in popular legitimacy; they originated and sustained themselves on the 
backs of tens of thousands of ordinary men and women who bravely took 
to the streets seeking the fall of tyrants and the restoration of their human 
dignity—at much risk to their lives and their fortunes in their respective 
states.
46
 Militaries may have been involved, either as caretakers follow-
ing the deposing of a president in the case of Egypt, or in a blanket re-
fusal to defend a tyrant in the case of Tunisia, but it was the people that 
drove the transformation.
47
 To describe them as insiders, or motivated by 
greed, or even relying upon the threat of violence to achieve their ends, is 
to mischaracterize their motivations and their aspirations considerably.  
  
 43. STEVEN R. DAVID, THIRD WORLD COUPS D’ETAT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 8 
(1987). 
 44. PAUL BROOKER, NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: THEORY, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 63 
(2000). 
 45. The Libyan uprising began with a series of demonstrations on February 16, 2011, against 
the rule of Libya’s strong man, Col. Muammar Qaddafi. Alan Cowell, Protests Take Aim at Leader 
of Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A14. The outcome was not settled until more than half-a-
year later, in August of 2011, when the rebels finally took control of Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli. 
Libya: The Fall of Tripoli—Wednesday 24 August 2011, GUARDIAN MIDDLE E. LIVE BLOG (Aug. 
24, 2011, 8:41 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/2011/aug/24/libya-rebels-
take-gaddafi-compound-live-updates. 
 46. Thomas Friedman, ‘I Am a Man’, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK10. 
 47. See Aya Batrawy & Sarah El Deeb, Egyptians Mark First Anniversary of ‘Friday of 
Rage’, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Jan. 27, 2012, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/53390704-68/military-protesters-mubarak-brotherhood.html.csp 
(describing Egyptian military as having taken power upon Mubarak’s ouster); Jonathan Eyal, Arab 
Spring May End in Political Winter; Mid-East, North Africa Could Be Chaotic for Years as Revolu-
tions Stall, THE STRAITS TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://sun7stiqa.straitstimes.com/ 
World/Story/STIStory_250169.html (indicating that Tunisia’s army refused to fire on protestors). 
The role of the military as partial agent of the democratic transformation is described more fully in 
Section III.B infra. 
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I would continue, as I would certainly regard such a description as 
appalling, but I need not, because I think it sufficiently obvious as not to 
require further discussion.  
Yet if the Arab Spring transformations are self-evidently not coups, 
are they “revolutions”? Do they, that is, involve the type of massive legal 
and constitutional structural changes that normally arise in a revolution, 
achieved through extraconstitutional means? Here, the picture is more 
mixed, mainly because it is difficult to know precisely how much formal 
constitutional change there will in these states once the transformations 
are complete. In Egypt, an elected legislature created a constitutional 
assembly to draft a new permanent constitution, but that assembly was 
promptly suspended by the judiciary.
48
 Later the military council dis-
banded the lower house of the legislature pursuant to a decision by the 
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt ruling that its entire composition 
was illegal.
49
 The recently elected president, Mohammad Morsi, ordered 
the lower house reinstated, this was challenged by the ruling military 
council, which in turn has led to even more confusion and delay concern-
ing the efforts to draft a new constitution.
50
  
Given this, it is hard to know precisely what kind of state will 
emerge in Egypt pending further developments. It is possible, however, 
that the constitution will not look very different from that of the Mubarak 
era. This may well be because the purpose of the protests was not so 
much the creation of an entire new and transformational legal and politi-
cal structure but rather the removal of a tyrant and the consequent reali-
zation of the democratic principles that already existed within the consti-
tutional fabric that had been grievously abused by Mubarak. . 
In Tunisia, the outcome is similarly uncertain, as elections for a 
constitutional assembly were not held until the October of 2011.
51
 It is 
not clear whether or not the changes to the constitution that the constitu-
tional assembly since formed will undertake will likewise be conserva-
tive and limited in their scope, or more pervasive and transformational.  
  
 48. Yasmine Saleh & Dina Zayed, Egyptian Court Blocks Creation of Constitutional Assem-
bly, THE DAILY STAR (LEB.), Apr. 11, 2012. 
 49. Nate Wright, Chaos and Fear in Cairo as Judges Shut Down First Free Parliament, THE 
TIMES (LONDON), June 15, 2012, at 31. 
 50. Egypt Court Delays Ruling On Constitutional Addendum, Parliament Decree Until 
Thursday, AHRAM ONLINE (July 17, 2012), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/47990/Egypt/ Politics-/Egypt-court-delays-ruling-on-
constitutional-addend.aspx.  
 51. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Postpones Election, Possibly Aiding New Parties, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A10; Paul Schemm, Tunisian Islamist Party Claims Election Victory, Set to 
Dominate Writing of New Constitution, NEWSER (Oct. 24, 2011, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.newser.com/article/d9qitbug0/tunisian-islamist-party-claims-election-victory-set-to-
dominate-writing-of-new-constitution.html. 
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Libya’s elections were only held in the summer of 2012 and thus 
the outcome in that state is in some ways even harder to predict.
52
 Never-
theless, while the precise structure of the future state certainly remains 
uncertain, it is hard to believe that whatever emerges will be anything but 
entirely transformed in a fundamental fashion, given that Col. Qaddafi 
has over the past several decades created a state structure that can only 
be described as bizarre and therefore unlikely to survive.
53
 The three 
states thus might offer three very different outcomes as concerns the sub-
stantive extent of formal legal and constitutional change undertaken. 
What about process? Are these changes more reforms than revolu-
tions? That is, is some sort of principle of legality being followed? In 
Libya, surely extralegal means were necessary to effect the change, as 
Qaddafi was deposed in war and no constitution existed to guide a sub-
sequent electoral process. Legality is perhaps most closely adhered to in 
Tunisia, where some respect for legal principles has applied. In Decem-
ber of 2010, President Ben Ali, the authoritarian ruler of Tunisia for dec-
ades, fled the country, and the prime minister indicated at first he would 
assume control.
54
 The Constitutional Council indicated in January of 
2011 that the post of president was vacant, but that in fact it would have 
to be the vice president who assumed control pursuant to Article 57 of 
the Tunisian Constitution, and not the prime minister.
55
 The vice presi-
dent assumed that position on January 14, 2011.
56
 The Court ruled that 
elections would have to be organized within sixty days.
57
 On March 3, 
2011, within the sixty day deadline, the election was scheduled for July 
of that same year.
58
 It was then delayed until October, and successfully 
held then.
59
 The process of transformation thus appeared to at least argu-
ably hold to principles of legality.   
  
 52. David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya: Monitors Praise Election, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at A8. 
 53. Libya, in theory, is not governed by any constitution save the Qur’an, though this does not 
seem to mean anything, in that Qaddafi himself is hardly committed to any sort of recognizable 
Islamic rule. NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC 
LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 86 (2002). The balance of govern-
ance is supposed to be undertaken by popular, local committees and congresses through some form 
of direct democracy. Id.; see also The World Factbook: Libya, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (last updated Nov. 7, 
2011). In theory, Qaddafi has not held an official position within the state since 1977; the state has 
no national leader. Mohamad Bazzi, What Did Qaddafi’s Green Book Really Say?, N.Y. TIMES, May 
25, 2011, at BR27. It is hard to believe that any subsequent regime would seek to continue this 
inanity. 
 54. Tunisia Swears in Interim Leader, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2011, 2:35 PM), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/201111513513854222.html.     
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Tarek Amara, Tunisia Interim President Calls July 24 Election, REUTERS (March 3, 2011, 
6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/03/us-tunisia-elections-idUSTRE7227IP2011 
0303.   . 
 59. Islamists to the Fore: Tunisia’s General Election, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2011, at 57. 
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Egypt straddles these two examples, in that the transformation pro-
cess purports to be legal, with the active participation of courts, yet there 
is cause for skepticism. The “constitution” under which Egypt is operat-
ing is no more than a series of provisional constitutional declarations 
issued by the ruling military council. The major declaration issued was 
effectively blessed by referendum in March of 2011 and in fact is little 
more than a series of amendments to the Mubarak era constitution.
60
 But 
the military has unilaterally amended it at times, including an amend-
ment in June of 2012, just before a presidential election, that appropriates 
to the military council powers previously belonging to the president.
61
 
Perhaps from the perspective of process it would be best to describe 
these changes then, at least in Tunisia and perhaps in Egypt, as 
“refolutions” in motion, borrowing from the phrase made famous by 
Timothy Garton Ash, among others, to describe the transformations in 
Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. 
62
 The line be-
tween reform and revolution is not always clear, as numerous scholars 
have pointed out. János Kis, for example, points to the traditional distinc-
tion in his work on the transformations that took place in Eastern Europe 
and the difficulty of placing those transformations into one camp or the 
other.
63
 Andrew Arato has focused on the same region and pointed to 
some of the same confounding dilemmas.
64
   
In the end, however, perhaps none of this really matters. Perhaps 
there is no purpose in getting lost in the thickets of taxonomy. If we are 
to examine these events from the standpoint of their legitimacy as com-
mitted democrats, it may be well enough to describe them as “democratic 
transformations.” The touchstone for their legitimacy, that is, must be 
neither the extent of the changes sought, nor the processes by which they 
were obtained, but rather by the extent of popular support for them. That 
is, even if Egypt, or Tunisia, end up with a constitution quite similar to 
the one that previously existed, yet, importantly, not put to the same 
grievous abuses, surely a fundamental transformation will have oc-
curred—one worthy of the support of a committed democrat. Surely the 
demand for a change of leadership is enough under these circumstances.  
  
 60. In March of 2011, a referendum was held whereby modest amendments to the existing 
Egyptian constitution were approved so that the document could serve as a provisional constitution. 
Jason Petrucci, Egypt’s Referendum, Reason for Guarded Optimism, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Mar. 31, 
2011, 5:35 PM), http://thedailynewsegypt.com/global-views/egypts-referendum-reason-for-guarded-
optimism.html. These became the basis of the second “constitutional declaration.”  . 
 61. Abdul Rahman Hussein, Egyptians Protest Against New Powers for Military Council, 
GUARDIAN, June 20, 2012, at 20. 
 62. Timothy Garton Ash, Revolution: The Springtime of Two Nations, THE NEW YORK 
REVIEW OF BOOKS (Jun. 15, 1989), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1989/ 
jun/15/revolution-the-springtime-of-two-nations/?pagination=false. 
 63. János Kis, Between Reform and Revolution, 12 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 300, 300–01 
(1998). 
 64. See, e.g., Andrew Arato, Constitutions and Continuity in the East European Transitions, 1 
CONSTELLATIONS 92, 92–93 (1994). 
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The important point is that these uprisings did not in any way re-
semble illegitimate military juntas seeking to impose their authority in 
place of that of a deposed president or dictator; they were popular de-
mands for massive and fundamental transformation. The mere fact that 
the people of the Arab states were not necessarily seeking broad constitu-
tional change so much as the political realization of democracy long 
promised and never delivered hardly seems to be any sort of reason to 
deprive their movements of the same normative power afforded to any 
democratic revolution.   
To illustrate why this is, one might well contrast the recent Arab 
Spring uprisings with the transformative changes of an earlier era, and 
specifically, Gamal Abdul Nasser’s takeover of Egypt. That was, let us 
be clear, engineered by a cadre of junior military officers (insiders), op-
erating in secret, using the threat of military force, completing their oper-
ation within a period of days and motivated certainly by a desire for 
power.
65
 This group of army officers created a Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC) which banned all political parties, vested all governmen-
tal authority in the RCC and then created a constitution which the dean 
of Arab constitutionalism, Nathan Brown, has described as perfection in 
“the art of writing anticonstitutionalist constitutions.”66 In that case, there 
was change of a radical nature that occurred. It heralded the end of a 
monarchy and its replacement with a nondemocratic “republic” engi-
neered and administered by a group of army officers who assumed all 
governmental authority. It almost certainly led to more change than a 
mass protest movement that paralyzed a nation and brought down a ty-
rant in order to institute the free and fair elections promised in the legal 
system that already existed. Yet it was also a coup, hardly the inspiration 
for democratic transformation. What the Nasser example demonstrates, 
more than anything, is that in assessing the legitimacy of these transfor-
mations from a democratic standpoint, we need not look to the extent of 
the legal and political change undertaken as a formal matter (meaning the 
level of amendment to the existing legal and constitutional structure), nor 
to its legality, but only to the extent to which the changes were truly the 
product of popular demand. 
B. Nondemocratic Political Transformation 
We might well look past process, or the extent of formal legal 
change, but it is not enough for the committed democrat to look solely to 
the level of the popular demand to assess the legitimacy of the transfor-
mation. The uncomfortable fact remains that not every transformation 
demanded by a people is democratic in impulse and outlook. Some, in 
fact, are very much the opposite. In such cases, it hardly behooves the 
  
 65. See M.E. YAPP, THE NEAR EAST SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 67 (1991). 
 66. BROWN, supra note 53, at 78–79. 
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democrat to support the change or deem it somehow legitimate, though 
of course it would be foolish and counterproductive to impose democra-
cy under such circumstances, in the face of such broad popular opposi-
tion. To illustrate by way of example, I turn to a decidedly nondemocrat-
ic political transformation, indeed a revolution under almost any defini-
tion, with which I am familiar as a scholar of modern Shi’ism—the Ira-
nian Revolution of 1979.    
That the Ayatollah Khomeini, the figure leading the Islamic Revo-
lution, was not a liberal democrat was a fact perfectly obvious to anyone 
paying attention. Long before the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s, 
the Ayatollah Khomeini had established an entire juristic career premised 
on the principle of Islamic government under the aegis of a Supreme 
Jurisprudent, the most knowledgeable of the clerics, who would adminis-
ter that state, carrying the same political authority as that of the Prophet 
Muhammad himself.
67
 These ideas largely crystallized while Khomeini 
was in exile in the 1960s in the seminaries of Najaf, in particular in the 
publication of a well-known pamphlet entitled “Islamic Government” 
that was based on a series of lectures offered in Najaf in 1970.
68
 Highly 
influential, and often translated as “Guardianship of the Jurist,”69 Kho-
meini lays out in the pamphlet in ample detail precisely the manner in 
which the government is to be managed, administered, and run by the 
leader of the clerical classes.
70
 On the matter of the people drafting their 
own legislation to determine their future, he had this to say: 
[I]f laws are needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need 
for you, after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up 
laws. . . . Everything is ready and waiting. All that remains is to draw 
up ministerial programs, and that can be accomplished with the help 
and cooperation of consultants and advisers who are experts in dif-
ferent fields, gathered together in a consultative assembly.
71
 
The true source of authority, however, does not lie with such tech-
nocrats. Thus, Khomeini indicated: 
But as for the supervision and supreme administration of the country, 
the dispensing of justice and the establishment of equitable relations 
among the people—these are precisely the subjects the faqih has 
studied. Whatever is needed to preserve national independence and 
  
 67. Hamid Mavani, Analysis of Khomeini’s Proofs for al-Wilaya al-Mutalqa (Comprehensive 
Authority) of the Jurist, in THE MOST LEARNED OF THE SHI’A: THE INSTITUTION OF MARJA’ TAQLID 
183, 183–84 (Linda S. Walbridge ed., 2001); see also Haider Ala Hamoudi, Between Realism and 
Resistance: Shi’i Islam and the Contemporary Liberal State, 11 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 107, 112 
(2009). 
 68. AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, ISLAM AND REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND 
DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEINI 25 (Hamid Algar ed. & trans., 1981). 
 69. Christopher de Bellaigue, Who Rules Iran?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (2002), 
available at http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/100P54.htm. 
 70. KHOMEINI, supra note 68, at 98. 
 71. Id. at 137–38. 
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liberty is, again, precisely what the faqih has to offer. For it is the 
faqih who refuses to submit to others or fall under the influence of 
foreigners, and who defends the rights of the nation and the freedom, 
independence and territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland . . . .
72
 
Elsewhere, in the event this was insufficiently clear, Khomeini indi-
cated: 
The judicial and governmental functions assigned . . . to the fuqaha 
[plural of faqih] are retained permanently.
73
 
The point is repeated for its emphasis later: 
The ‘ulama [scholars] of Islam have been appointed . . . to the posi-
tion of ruler and judge, and these positions belong to them in perpetu-
ity.
74
 
Khomeini not only failed to dissemble respecting these matters, he 
considered it a higher calling to disseminate his ideas. Concerning the 
Islamic government, led by the jurist as described above, he had this to 
say in his highly influential 1970 pamphlet: “It is our duty to work to-
ward the establishment of Islamic government. The first activity we must 
undertake in this respect is the propagation of our cause; that is how we 
must begin.”75 
Taking up his own challenge, Khomeini continued to advance these 
ideas from exile throughout the 1970s with such ferocity and vigor that 
he managed to alienate much of the Najaf senior establishment, among 
them the Quietist Abol Qasim al-Khu’i, and even the Grand Ayatollah of 
his day, the formidable Sayyid Muhsin Al-Hakim.
76
 Because of his ideas, 
he was passed over for the position of Supreme Jurisprudent in Najaf 
after Hakim’s death in favor of Khu’i, who did not advocate clerical en-
gagement in politics, rendering Khomeini something of an outlier within 
Najaf itself.
77
 
In response, Khomeini turned against Najaf for its political apathy 
concerning Iran, going so far as to dismiss its clerics as “sound asleep” in 
one remarkable declaration, issued in 1971,
78
 and “dead and buried”79 in 
another. Yet despite senior jurist apathy within Iraq, Khomeini’s ideas 
respecting Islamic government had been percolating among rising schol-
  
 72. Id. at 137. 
 73. Id. at 98. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 126. 
 76. Devin J. Stewart, The Portrayal of an Academic Rivalry: Najaf and Qum in the Writings 
and Speeches of Khomeini, 1964–78, in THE MOST LEARNED OF THE SHI’A: THE INSTITUTION OF 
MARJA’ TAQLID, supra note 67, at 216, 223. 
 77. See id. 
 78. KHOMEINI, supra note 68, at 203. 
 79. Id. at 218. 
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ars such as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.
80
 In particular, they inspired Sadr 
to develop more precise guidelines, and add more intellectual heft, re-
specting the future Islamic state and the means by which the Supreme 
Jurist would be determined.
81
 
Underlying all of these ideas from Khomeini was a hatred and con-
tempt for the West that was given frequent voice. In 1964, upon the 
Shah’s granting of immunity from Iranian prosecution to soldiers of the 
United States, Khomeini accused the government of “reduc[ing] the Ira-
nian people to a level lower than that of an American dog.”82 Later in the 
same speech he described the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the Soviet Union each as more “unclean” than the other.83 In his 1970 
pamphlet, he described the United States and the United Kingdom as 
imperialists and indicated that faqih rule is necessary because it is the 
“faqih who refuse[d] to submit to others or fall under the influence of 
foreigners” and “who does not deviate either to the left or to the right,” 
thinly veiled references to the Soviet Union and the United States, re-
spectively.
84
 In 1972, in a message to Muslim students in North America, 
he indicated that “[i]mperialism of the left and of the right have joined 
hands in their efforts to annihilate the Muslim peoples.”85 In February of 
1978, nearly a year before the Shah’s departure, he described the British, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States as bringing misfortune upon Iran 
in its modern history and described the Carter Administration in particu-
lar as employing the “logic of bandits.”86 The consistency and stridency 
of the rhetoric over two decades of speeches and writings is remarkable. 
All of this, both the program for Islamic government and its stri-
dently anti-imperialist, regional liberation emphasis, was a matter of so 
much debate, and so much intellectual ferment, that it is very difficult to 
take seriously any claim that Khomeini had somehow claimed any inter-
est in a democratic transformation in his society, as opposed to an Islam-
izing one. Until his return to Iran, Khomeini never suggested any devia-
tion from his long established view that the state had to be Islamic and 
the people would not be consulted on the point in any real way.
87
 Several 
  
 80. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want a Revolution: Interpretive Communities and 
the Origins of Islamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 249, 272–73 (2008). 
 81. CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW: MUHAMMAD BAQER AS-SADR, NAJAF 
AND THE SHI’I INTERNATIONAL 70 (1993). It would thus be fair to say that the structural details of 
the state that Khomeini envisioned was not laid out until Sadr’s work. Id. Of the essential principle, 
however, that the jurists would act as rulers and judges, there could be no doubt, Khomeini had, as 
the main text shows, spent his entire life advancing, and indeed proselytizing, the notion of juristic 
rule wherein the Supreme Jurisprudent would occupy a political leadership role akin to that of the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
 82. KHOMEINI, supra note 68, at 182. 
 83. Id. at 185. 
 84. Id. at 137. 
 85. Id. at 210. 
 86. Id. at 221, 224. 
 87. See SHAUL BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS: IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC 
REVOLUTION 72 (1984). At most, Khomeini was prepared to concede a referendum, but solely for 
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months before his arrival in Iran, and completely consistent with his ex-
tensive work over the previous several decades, he described the revolu-
tion as “one hundred percent Islamic” and its leadership as “belong[ing] 
to the clerical community.”88  
Were Khomeini a minor figure in the 1979 Revolution who had 
managed to take control by some fortuitous circumstance, it might be 
maintained that somehow the revolution was democratic if Khomeini 
himself was not. Yet this was not the case, Khomeini was the undisputed 
face and voice of the revolution. Thus, he was given authority within 
days of his return to appoint an executive government.
89
 Given all of this, 
if anyone in Iran in the late 1970s agitating in favor of Khomeini’s return 
to lead the state was duped into believing Khomeini was a liberal demo-
crat or could possibly find liberal democracy acceptable, they had man-
aged to dupe themselves. Assuming the bulk of the Iranian people lead-
ing the revolution to be reasonably aware of Khomeini’s consistent posi-
tions over the course of decades, the only conclusion is that this trans-
formation designed to hand him executive control was indeed a revolu-
tion, but it was by no means democratic, in spirit or intent, even if some, 
even some within Iran, may well have wished it so. 
As Khomeini’s designs and his positions, were well known to any-
one who bothered to pay the slightest attention to his writings, his 
speeches, and his juristic career, it is no surprise that he began to imple-
ment them immediately. The creation of the Islamic state that had been 
long discussed among activists began to take shape, precisely in the form 
he, along with Sadr and others, had originally presented as a “blueprint” 
in their extensive work on the subject.
90
 
The temptation to accept the theory of duplicity on the part of the 
Khomeini—that he promised a people’s choice and a democracy in the 
sense we understand it and then failed to deliver on it—would be strong 
among those committed to democratic governance. But the lesson might 
be that we must come more fully to terms with a core, uncomfortable 
truth. Not every people is particularly interested at any given time in 
liberation through self-rule and that various ideological mirages, from 
Marxism to these rather extreme manifestations of political Islam involv-
ing juristic supervision of government and judiciary have their influence 
and their sway at times.
91
 Any attempt to make some sense of the demo-
cratic revolution, and indeed to restore it to the exalted normative place 
  
the purpose of confirming that the people had chosen an Islamic state, not as a means of offering a 
free choice. Id. Khomeini’s position was that the “referendum” had already taken place in the form 
of the popular uprising against the Shah. Id. 
 88. Id. at 48. 
 89. BAKHASH, supra note 87, at 51. 
 90. MALLAT, supra note 81, at 6. 
 91. As the earlier references to the Green Revolution make clear, I would certainly not char-
acterize Iran’s more recent convulsions as being anything but fundamentally democratic in impulse. 
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to which it belongs, requires us to acknowledge this, and to admit that 
where our normative values are not shared, they will not be realized.  
III. REMOVING THE FORMALIST BARRIERS 
A. The Typology of the Transformation 
Let us then take the strands outlined above and attempt to combine 
them into a more cohesive set of ideas concerning the democratic revolu-
tion cum coup cum radical reform, all of which I shall bundle into the 
single word “transformation,” denoting as it does substantive political 
change of the more fundamental sort, to be distinguished from incremen-
tal and ordinary lawmaking. The first strand, again, is to free ourselves 
from the shackles of taxonomy. That is, the precise typology of the trans-
formation is of little moment for our purposes, whether it be premised on 
legal continuity (as in East Europe’s various velvet revolutions), focused 
primarily on the removal of a corrupt and tyrannical political leadership 
with little formal legal change (as may yet occur in some states of the 
Arab Spring), or involving an entire break with legality and the existing 
political and legal regime (as in the American, French, and Romanian 
Revolutions, and as is sure to occur in Libya).  
To be absolutely clear, I mean this not as generalized criticism of 
the valuable and important work that has been done in categorization in 
this area, but rather only that, to the extent that the project involves the 
restoration of the democratic revolution as normative commitment, 
something too much can be made of typology. Once such typologies are 
abandoned, the second, related strand is to look to the substance of the 
transformation and the extent to which it might be characterized as one 
that is committed to the establishment of continued popular rule as its 
core normative commitment, rather than the use of the people and evi-
dent popular demands as instrument to the creation of another form of 
government, be it Marxist, nondemocratic Islamist, or anything else. 
Viewed through such a lens, there was little that was democratic 
about the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in both conception and execution, 
even as the more recent Green Revolution in Iran was fundamentally 
democratic.
92
 There was absolutely nothing democratic about Nasser’s 
Free Officer Coup in Egypt in 1952, involving as it did the repeal of a 
democratic constitution and the subsequent banning of all political par-
ties in Egypt, signaling what one prominent Egyptian commentator has 
  
 92. I do not mean by this that there were no liberal democratic groups that might have partici-
pated in the 1979 Revolution, hoping that despite Khomeini’s well established position respecting 
Islamic rule, some space might exist for them to project their own vision onto the state more success-
fully than Khomeini might project his. It would be silly to reduce all revolutionaries to any single 
rigid archetype in any revolutionary transformation. The point is that the general thrust of the Irani-
an Revolution, and most importantly the figure who led it, was the establishment of juristic, not 
popular, rule. 
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described as the end of democracy in Egypt.
93
 The same could not be 
said respecting the massive, popular uprisings that led to the transfor-
mations in Eastern Europe, the “refolutions” that generally, with the ex-
ception of Romania, adhered to strict processes of legality.  
Similarly, and most relevant for the purposes of this Article, the 
transformations of the Arab Spring are unambiguously grounded in as-
sumptions of popular sovereignty. Some of these states, as with Libya, 
will, assuming they can manage their transformations despite significant 
obstacles,
94
 lead to fundamental transformations of state structure in a 
manner that surely will involve a break with legality. It is hard to under-
stand how Qaddafi’s bewildering Jamahariyya structure95 is supposed to 
function, let alone precisely how one would amend it to adhere to princi-
ples of legality. With others, such as Tunisia, the matter is far less cer-
tain. Constitutional amendment, perhaps far reaching, perhaps profound, 
but nonetheless legal (meaning in conformity with existing rules of 
amendment as laid out in the current constitution) might be a potential 
promising means to achieve necessary change.  
Naturally all such changes would need to be evaluated on a continu-
ing basis to ensure that they were democratic. The road to democratic 
rule in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya alike is fraught with peril. By privileg-
ing substance over form, a sensible temporal reexamination of this sort is 
more possible than when attempting to formally describe a particular 
change as a “revolution,” “reform,” or a “coup.”  
Yet, the more important result of liberating the democratic trans-
formation from the shackles of form is that this permits the conception of 
the democratic transformation to be restored to the exalted and romantic 
place to which a committed democrat would like to place it. Adherence 
to the form of the change simply will not serve to achieve this. It is im-
possible to imagine that one finds a group of people who bravely take to 
the streets, as in Syria, under a hail of live ammunition to demand the 
people’s right to rule themselves, dying in significant numbers on a daily 
basis as a result, any less inspiring if they manage to achieve their aims 
with the belated acquiescence of the existing regime through a series of 
far reaching legislative and constitutional changes negotiated in an East 
European style “round table.”96 The brave men and women of Tahrir 
  
 93. Ahmed Othman, The Revolution of July 23 and the End of Democracy in Egypt, ASHARQ 
ALAWSAT, July 23, 2011, at 20. 
 94. Rami Al-Shaheibi, Libyan Defense Minister Seeks Deal in Seized Town, ARAB NEWS 
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article568011.ece (quoting U.N. Envoy for Libya 
Ian Martin that “weak, at times absent, state institutions, coupled with the long absence of political 
parties and civil society organizations . . . render the country's transition more difficult”). 
 95. BROWN, supra note 53, at 86 (describing a confounding organization involving myriad 
committees and congresses acting in theory through some form of direct democracy at local levels). 
 96. See Jon Elster, Introduction, in THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF 
COMMUNISM 1, 3 (Jon Elster ed., 1996) (describing the round table process in the states of the for-
mer Soviet bloc). 
File: Hamoudi_To_Darby Created on: 11/17/2012 4:07:00 PM Last Printed: 11/18/2012 9:55:00 PM 
2012] ARAB SPRING 721 
 
Square are no less entitled to the sacred space of the democratic revolu-
tion than those of Libya even if the change they manage to achieve ad-
heres to processes of legality or involves in the end less formal change to 
the legal structure. 
This is largely because legality has nothing to do with the nobility 
of the protesters, but rather is decided more by the tyrant, or at least the 
institutions of authority. An Eastern European communist regime wise 
enough to see that its time has come to an end which seeks maximum 
near term influence through round table negotiations will be able to 
avoid the messiness of “nonconstitutional” change through earnest bar-
gaining, while an unrepentant and bloody tyrant such as Romania’s 
Ceauşescu leaves his people no choice but the means of non-legality.97 
The process mechanisms effectively dictated by the autocrats who con-
trol the means of violence should hardly impinge upon our core romantic 
and normative commitment to the democratic protesters themselves. The 
romantic conception in the end is of a people who seek change of the 
fundamental, transformational sort, whose end is the creation or restora-
tion of a state that is ruled by its people and whose people constitute the 
legitimacy for its existence. The means by which this is achieved are 
largely irrelevant. 
B. Transformation and Agency 
The typology of the revolution is related to, if distinct from, another 
formal distinction from which we need to free ourselves: the agency of 
the democratic transformation. Let us begin with a rather salutary exam-
ple where democratic transformation was not initiated by the people—
that of post-Franco Spain.
98
 Commentators frequently discuss the rather 
remarkable manner in which democratic change was brought about in 
Spain through the enactment of a Fundamental Law, thereby adopting 
Franco’s authoritarian lawmaking model to ensure careful adherence to 
principles of legality in the democratization process.
99
  
But there is another fascinating aspect of Spain’s democratic trans-
formation that is worth exploring. It was administered by a monarch 
whom Franco had trusted would ensure authoritarian continuity.
100
 A 
king vested with absolute authority, that is to say, seems as capable as 
the people for bringing about democratic transformations under the prop-
er conditions. Naturally, and as discussed earlier in this Article, neither a 
  
 97. See Ruth Jackson Lee, The Stepchildren of the EU: Bulgaria and Romania, 16 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 361, 370 (2007).  
 98. ANDREA BONIME-BLANC, SPAIN’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTITUTION-MAKING 9 (1987). 
 99. Id. at 24. 
 100. Id. at 18 (describing earlier attempts at democratic reform undertaken by Franco and the 
first post-Franco prime minister as “feeble” and indicating that democratization did not begin in 
earnest until the King chose to embark upon that course). 
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democratically minded monarch nor a foreign power can bring democra-
tization to (or impose democratization upon) a people uninterested in it. 
There is no doubt that pressures for democratic reform had been building 
in Spain when the king embarked upon the course he did.
101
 Yet without 
the king, the success of the democratic transformation was by no means 
assured. The king was, without serious question, the agent for the trans-
formation even if the transformation required conditions other than the 
king’s good intentions to sustain itself. 
In stark contrast, despite repeated calls for political reform over the 
course of years, and despite repeated promises to undertake such re-
forms, the rulers threatened by the Arab Spring generally took precisely 
the reverse course, stalling any changes in favor of democratization until 
the promises of such reforms could no longer be taken seriously by any 
reasonable person.
102
 Those transformations were initiated instead by 
  
 101. Id. at 22–23. 
 102. To take the simplest example, in the middle of the last decade, President Hosni Mubarak 
of Egypt promised a series of wide-ranging and much touted democratic reforms that were supposed 
to permit, among other things, true competition in presidential elections. Megan K. Stack & Sonni 
Efron, President of Egypt Calls for Open Election, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at A1. The subse-
quent elections turned out to be anything but fair and free—there were widespread voting irregulari-
ties reported, and a leading opposition candidate, liberal activist Ayman Nour, was in jail during the 
election. Editorial, Not Fair, Not Free, BALT. SUN, Dec. 13, 2005, at 18A. Moreover, at the same 
time that these supposedly democratic reforms were set to take place, President Mubarak was 
grooming his son to take his place. Daniel Williams, Egyptians Wonder if Dynasty Is Near; Mubar-
ak’s Son Gaining Prominence, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2004, at A14. This sort of warped dynastic 
succession masquerading as republicanism took place in Syria as well, where Bashar al-Asad had 
replaced his father in 2000. As with Mubarak, Bashar has long promised reforms that have yet to be 
delivered. Fouad Ajami, Your Silence Is Killing Us; As a People Rise in Revolt, a Son Emulates the 
Cruelty of His Father, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 2011, at 0. Libya had taken a similar course with Seif 
al-Islam el-Qaddafi, the son of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, setting himself up to replace his father 
and promising, as did Bashar al-Asad, to undertake political and economic reform. Landon Thomas 
Jr., Unknotting Father’s Reins in Hope of ‘Reinventing’ Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at A11. 
Given the rather disconcerting Arab pattern, the surprise lies not so much in the promise but in the 
credulous Western media and government attention Seif seemed to garner for his reform charade. Id. 
(describing Seif as trying to “dismantle” the authoritarian and socialist structure his father had creat-
ed, indicating he had a “bold independent streak” and suggesting there was “evidence of popular 
support” for Seif domestically); see also Anton La Guardia, Gaddafi’s Son Wanted as Torture 
Watchdog, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 26, 2006, at 19 (describing Seif as “the most prominent 
voice for political reform in Libya”). Incredibly, the United Kingdom even apparently wanted him to 
act as some sort of independent “watchdog” to ensure that anyone deported from the U.K. to Libya 
was not tortured. Id. Leaving aside the preposterous notion that a son could under any circumstances 
be considered an independent “watchdog” over the activities of his father’s regime, left hardly dis-
cussed by reputable sources was the possibility that Seif was grandstanding to receive international 
attention and hardly interested in anything other than the accumulation of power, precisely as Bashar 
and Gamal were in similarly situated regimes. In any event, the good intentions of this supposed 
political reformer with the bold independent streak have been forced to light by popular demands to 
end the political system that he was supposedly working so hard to “dismantle.” Rather than joining 
their cause, he hitched his wagon to his father’s and described the regime opponents as “rats.” 
InomineX, Libya: 31 August 2011, Saif al-Islam Gadhafi Speech, English Summary, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRPsrYxt_XA&feature=related. He has been 
indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in connection with the 
repression of protesters, which included the use of live fire ammunition to disperse crowds and the 
deployment of snipers to fire on those leaving mosques after the Friday prayers. Zach Zagger, ICC 
Issues Arrest Warrants for Libya Leader Gaddafi, His Son, Head of Intelligence, JURIST (June 27, 
2011, 8:43 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/icc-issues-arrest-warrants-for-libya-leader-
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inspiring masses of ordinary people courageously demanding the crea-
tion of regimes of popular sovereignty as described earlier.
103
 Yet, the 
role of other institutions cannot be gainsaid. In particular, the army 
proved to be a decisive agent of the democratic transformations through-
out the Arab Spring. Where the army hitched itself to the fate of the re-
gime, as in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, the outcome has been far less 
certain, or dramatically unsuccessful.
104
 Where the army has declined the 
invitation to kill its own people, as in Egypt and Tunisia, the ouster of the 
sitting ruler was swift.
105
 In Egypt, in fact, the military’s role is signifi-
cant enough, particularly in transition, that it might well be considered in 
something of a (tense, perilous but nonetheless real) partnership with the 
Egyptian people in managing the transformation.
106
 Both the people and 
the army are thus equal agents in engineering the fate of the transfor-
mation in these states.
107
  
Thus, just as distinctions between “coup,” “reform,” and “revolu-
tion” are less than helpful in describing and resurrecting the romantic 
appeal and normative power of democratic transformations, so is a re-
lentless focus on the people as being the exclusive agent of such trans-
formation. Naturally, the existence of popular support and legitimacy for 
any transformation is fundamentally important, whether it be registered 
at the moment of change or years later, at first election. A democratic 
transformation in which the people are not invested and where the people 
seek something else entirely is hardly self-sustaining. Yet the precise role 
of the popular will in achieving the change, relative to other institutions 
or influences, might well be overstated. The revolution, that is to say, 
should require the people’s support to earn the sacred space. When that 
support is precisely manifested, however, is of less importance.  
  
gaddafi,-his-son-head-of-intelligence.php. A less fitting candidate for human rights “watchdog” can 
scarcely be imagined. 
 103. See discussion supra Part I. 
 104. Borzou Daragahi, Other Regimes Emboldened by Gadhafi's Brutal Tactics; Arab Leaders 
in Yemen and Elsewhere Follow His Lead in Using Extreme Force to Stay in Power, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 20, 2011, at C20. 
 105. Eyal, supra note 47 (“Former Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled only when 
his soldiers were no longer prepared to fire on demonstrators; Egypt’s Mr[.] Mubarak left under 
similar circumstances.”). 
 106. The words of Egypt’s notorious star novelist Alaa Al Aswany, author of the best-selling 
The Yacoubian Building, perhaps best described this uneasy but real relationship as between people 
and military. In an interview with Thomas Friedman, Al Aswany indicated “[w]e have had a revolu-
tion here that succeeded—but is not in power. So the goals of the revolution are being applied by an 
agent, the army, which I think is sincere in wanting to do the right things, but it is not by nature 
revolutionary.” Thomas Friedman, Pay Attention, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2011, at WK8.  
 107. . It is commonly reported that very serious questions have arisen recently respecting the 
democratic commitments of the military rulers of Egypt, as they begin to repress protestors and 
protect their own economic and political interests. See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, Saving the Egyptian 
Revolution from the Military, JURIST (Dec. 27, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/chibli-mallat-
egypt-military.php. This is indeed troubling, yet it only demonstrates the central role that the military 
has played and is playing in managing the democratic revolution. If the military turns enemy of the 
revolution, that is, the democratic future of Egypt is far more precarious. 
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C. The Externally Imposed Democratic Transformation 
Seen in this light, the externally imposed democratic transformation 
is little more than locating the agency for democratic transformation at 
least in part in a force that is neither a domestic monarch (as in Spain) 
nor a domestic military (as in Tunisia and Egypt) but something external 
to the nation-state altogether. In some cases, such agency might even 
precede popular convulsions in favor of democratic rule because of the 
effective machinery of repression organized by the state. I was in Iraq 
during its first truly democratic elections, at the start of 2005.
108
 I re-
member the manner in which men, women, and children took to the 
streets before sunrise, the cities silent because of the security ban on 
driving vehicles, each with a grim sense of determination and purpose on 
their way to voting booths in many cases miles away, braving suicide 
bombers, terrorist threats to observe a boycott, and extremist promises of 
future retaliation against any who dared to show up to vote.
109
 I was there 
as late morning turned to afternoon, and the streets began to erupt in joy-
ous celebration, with hordes of young people waving their purple fingers 
(stained by ink after voting, to prevent voter fraud) at any camera they 
could find, determined to show their lack of fear at those who sought to 
intimidate them against voting. Each was dressed in his finest wear, as if 
no more important occasion than this could be imagined. If this did not 
meet whatever standard we seek to establish in order to restore democrat-
ic transformation as romantic commitment, then quite frankly nothing 
does.  
It would be wrong to say that these people brought about the demo-
cratic transformation in their state. It would be equally wrong to say that 
they did not want it. There was nothing devoid of popular legitimacy in 
this set of events, irrespective of the fact that they were brought about 
initially by the United States. In fact, even to describe the democratiza-
tion process as being solely externally imposed prior to that election 
  
 108. At that time, I served as a Project Manager for a legal education reform project that was 
managed by the International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University. I was specifically 
charged with introducing experiential forms of education into the Iraqi law school curriculum. Other 
aspects of the project included library enhancement and other forms of curricular reform. The entire 
project was managed by Sermid Al-Sarraf in Baghdad and led from Chicago by David Guinn and 
Cherif Bassiouni. 
 109. HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA: AN IRAQI-AMERICAN MEMOIR 
248–49 (2008) [hereinafter HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA]. To be sure, there were limita-
tions respecting the overall success of the democratic experiment in Iraq in 2005 owing largely to the 
fact that the Sunni population had largely respected the electoral boycott, either out of fear or con-
viction, thereby exacerbating existing sectarian divisions. Id. at 249. This boycott was never repeat-
ed, however, and Iraqis currently vote in large numbers irrespective of sect or ethnicity. Haider Ala 
Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence and Identitarian Politics: Elections and Governance in Iraq, 51 
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 78, 94 (2010) [hereinafter Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence], 
http://www.harvardilj.org/online. In any event, the point here is not that the initial election was an 
untrammeled success but that it was democratic and successful enough (particularly when viewed in 
conjunction with subsequent elections in Iraq which are deeply democratic) to act as inspiration for 
democratic transformation. 
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would be a mistake. The greatest proponent for near-term elections after 
the American invasion was not the United States, which counseled delay 
repeatedly, but rather the high Shi’i cleric Ali Sistani, who demanded 
elections as early as June of 2003, less than two months after Saddam’s 
statue had been brought down in Firdous Square in central Baghdad.
110
 
Agency for democratic transformation, that is to say, in Iraq was divided 
among three different entities. The first was the United States, whose 
removal of an unspeakable tyrant made it possible for domestic elites to 
voice their demands without being summarily executed.
111
 The second 
were domestic elites themselves, who demanded early elections and 
similarly sought that they be held on schedule and without delay.
112
 And 
the third, of course, were the Iraqi people, who have in repeated electoral 
events voted in overwhelming numbers irrespective of ethnicity, religion, 
or sectarian group. 
In other words, a focus on both the typology and agency of demo-
cratic transformation might be distracting us from what should be the 
core undertaking, which is to evaluate the transformation through its 
commitment to and realization of popular democratic rule. It may in the 
end be no more important that the transformation be characterized as 
“reform” or “revolution” than it is that it be led in the first instance by 
the people, the army, a monarch, a foreign power, or (more likely) some 
rather complex combination of the foregoing. The point is not that a 
democratic transformation can be possible without public support—
clearly it cannot be. The point, rather, is that an additional agent is often 
required, at times to instigate the reform, at other times to support it, and 
the nationality of that agent hardly need concern the committed demo-
crat. 
Thus, internal transformations that do not lead to the creation of 
popular democratic rule, even those that might enjoy popular legitimacy 
in their time (such as Khomeini’s Iran) are hardly inspirations for those 
of us passionately, normatively, and romantically committed to a concep-
tion of democratic transformation. Those that do lead to democratic 
transformation, even if brought about in the first instance by a well-
intentioned king rather than the people, as in Spain, may be extolled. 
Similarly, external regime transformations often, indeed almost always, 
  
 110. Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence, supra note 109, at 85. 
 111. For more details respecting the manner in which the Saddam regime managed to silence 
the clerical elite wherever and whenever they sought political change of any sort, see id. 
 112. This included not only Sistani and the clerical elite, but the existing interim Iraqi govern-
ment as well as the Kurdish political leadership. See ALI A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: 
WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE PEACE 344–46 (2007). Again, there was initial Sunni disaffection 
from the state and a resulting opposition to elections, a matter that in other contexts I have empha-
sized as having been particularly problematic. Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence, supra note 109, at 
93–94; see also HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 109, at 248–49. Yet for our 
purposes it suffices to say that the Iraqi people currently embrace democratic governance with fer-
vor, and they have been instrumental in ensuring its qualified success to date. Of this there can be 
little doubt.  
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do not lead to the establishment of popular democratic rule, and are as 
such justifiably enough castigated. These would include the attempted 
destruction of a state and its incorporation into the invading state, as in 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990113 and the establishment of client states 
largely dependent on host state support to survive, as in former Soviet 
controlled Eastern Europe
114
 or Lebanon during the period of Syrian oc-
cupation.
115
  
Yet, at times the external intervention does lead to the creation of 
popular democratic regimes, in a manner that we later almost uniformly 
regard as salutary and that as a result ought to require us to reevaluate 
whether or not our commitment to the sovereignty of tyrants is as deep as 
we actually say it is. Perhaps the example par excellence of unabashed 
democratic imposition over elite domestic objection lies in the example 
of Japan. Following the conquest of Japan at the end of World War II, 
the United States undertook a military occupation of the country and 
sought a rather thorough transformation of its regime from that which 
was authoritarian to something far more democratic.
116
 The extent and 
necessity of constitutional changes to bring this about proved to be 
among the most contentious disputes between the United States and Jap-
anese legal elites.
117
  
The Japanese, for their part, had created a committee known as the 
Matsumoto Committee.
118
 Its initial purpose was to engage in a constitu-
tional study; however, it quickly proposed a constitution that attempted 
to adhere as closely as possible to the principles of the existing Meiji 
Constitution.
119
 One would assume that international law would then 
impose upon the United States duties as occupier to accept such a revi-
sion, as the Hague Convention requires a state to uphold laws in force 
“unless absolutely prevented,”120 and the Matsumoto Committee, Japa-
nese in origin and inception, was making a concerted effort to uphold 
existing Japanese law.  
  
 113. ALLAWI, supra note 112, at 43. 
 114. JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND 
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 236–38 
(1996). 
 115. Upon the conclusion of the Ta’if accords in 1990 and the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil 
War, Syria became the dominant power within Lebanese politics, given the equivalent of a mandate 
to control its affairs. FAWWAZ TRABOULSI, A HISTORY OF MODERN LEBANON 245–46 (2007). That 
only ended with the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the subsequent Cedar 
Revolution. MICHAEL YOUNG, THE GHOSTS OF MARTYRS SQUARE: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF 
LEBANON’S LIFE STRUGGLE 54, 57 (2010) (referring to the Cedar Revolution as the “Independence 
Intifada”). 
 116. See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 21, at v–vi. 
 117. See id. at 23. 
 118. Id. at 73–74. 
 119. See id. at 74–75. 
 120. Hague Convention IV, supra note 20, at art. 43. 
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Yet this was not to be. MacArthur had earlier told Prime Minister 
Konoe that the Meiji Constitution required significant revision to be suf-
ficiently democratic.
121
 Faced with an existing constitution in a separate 
sovereign nation-state, MacArthur elected to impose his vision. The 
Matsumoto proposal was summarily rejected, described in a meeting 
with the Japanese representatives as “wholly unacceptable” to MacAr-
thur.
122
 An alternative was completed on MacArthur’s orders in six days, 
by a group of twenty-one Americans which, as a cover memorandum to 
MacArthur proudly explained, included “nearly every form of American 
political thought.”123 It was offered with an ultimatum—either the docu-
ment itself would be presented as the proposal of the Japanese govern-
ment, or the government would not survive politically, as it would lose 
the support of MacArthur himself.
124
 This document became the template 
of the ultimate constitution enacted in Japan about a year later, a consti-
tution that remains in force and is the foundational document of its liber-
al democracy.
125
 
Those of us committed to democratic transformation, however 
achieved, find little difficultly with all that transpired. The imposition, 
after all, was upon the Matsumoto Committee, which was entitled to no 
presumption of popular legitimacy, and MacArthur’s express purpose 
was to ensure greater democratic transformation.
126
 The revised constitu-
tion has achieved that purpose to admirable effect over the past several 
decades, ruling over a nation that, notwithstanding its current economic 
problems, rose from near total destruction to becoming the second largest 
economy in the world with dizzying speed.
127
 There is very little to regret 
in this story. 
By contrast, those who castigate the externally imposed democratic 
transformation as per se illegitimate and a violation of the sovereignty of 
another state will no doubt have a harder time explaining why it is that 
the United States was entitled to act as it did. The rather happy story of 
the evolution of Japan and Germany from fascist nightmares to demo-
cratic, stable nations stands in stark contrast, after all, to the principle 
that interference in the internal affairs of other states constitutes an in-
fringement on their sovereignty, a core violation of the United Nations 
Charter
128
 if nothing else. Yet, would anyone actually think it was the 
  
 121. See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 21, at 51. 
 122. Id. at 108. 
 123. Id. at 106 (emphasis added). 
 124. See id. at 111.  
 125. See id. at 110, 329. 
 126. See id. at 51. 
 127. See Michael A. Panton, Politics, Practice and Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the Japa-
nese Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 163, 197–98 (2008). 
 128. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
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duty of the Allied powers to permit the continued existence of Nazi 
Germany rather than impose democratic rule? If not, then precisely how 
does one less apologetic than I am about the promise of imposed democ-
racy expansion over the desires of repressive domestic forces go about 
defending the World War II examples while demanding greater respect 
be given to sovereignty for Iraq under Saddam Hussein in light of his 
attempted genocide of two separate indigenous populations?
129
  
The explanation most often begins with Reisman’s wise insight that 
while making regime change “generally lawful” would render interna-
tional law into a nullity, regime change as a “contextually appropriate 
instrument of an intrinsically lawful action” is another matter.130 Thus, to 
extend Reisman’s analysis, Japan and Germany had engaged in such 
broad, unconscionable violations of international law, from expansion-
ism to genocide, that to leave the regimes in place, even after the com-
munity of nations had forced their abatement, would only invite further 
international instability, and the replacement of the regimes was the only 
alternative, the “contextually appropriate instrument” to address the vio-
lations that had transpired. 
While it is perfectly obvious that no system of international law 
could sustain itself if it became generally acceptable for one state to 
obliterate another for any reason it saw fit, this justification for regime 
change seems rather unconvincing and incomplete, at least when viewed 
through a contemporary lens. Could it really be said that preventing the 
Japanese government from enacting its own constitution was the “con-
textually appropriate” course in light of Japan’s earlier, nearly uncondi-
tional surrender at Potsdam,
131
 its seemingly sincere belief that the Meiji 
constitution was sufficiently democratic,
132
 and the requirement of the 
Hague Convention to apply laws in force in a territory under occupa-
tion?
133
 If the action was still justified because of the danger that Japan 
had only a few years earlier posed to its neighbors, then under what prin-
ciple could it not have been “contextually appropriate” to force a demo-
cratic constitution upon Iraq, a totalitarian state that had invaded its 
neighbors twice and had to be forcibly removed each time?
134
 It is true 
that a sanctions regime imposed in Iraq since 1991 had effectively crip-
  
 129. Saddam’s brutality as against his own people is well documented, but involves among 
other things the organized killing of hundreds of thousands of Kurds in the latter part of the 1980s 
and similar number of Shi’a in 1991, the latter undertaken by tanks adorned with the painted slogan 
“[n]o Shi‘is [will survive] after today.” MARION FAROUK-SLUGLETT & PETER SLUGLETT, IRAQ 
SINCE 1958: FROM REVOLUTION TO DICTATORSHIP 269–70, 289 (2001). 
 130. Reisman, supra note 8, at 89 (emphasis in original). 
 131. See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 21, at 30. 
 132. See id. at 51. 
 133. Hague Convention IV, supra note 20, at art. 43. 
 134. Iraq was largely responsible for starting hostilities with Iran in 1980 through a series of air 
raids, the impetus being a desire by Saddam Hussein to be the undisputed power broker within the 
Persian Gulf region. See FAROUK-SLUGLETT & SLUGLETT, supra note 129, at 256–57. It moreover 
invaded Kuwait in August of 1990 and claimed it as its own province. Id. at 279. 
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pled its army and prevented it from being a significant threat, but does 
the catastrophic effect that sanctions have upon a civilian population
135
 
truly make it the more “contextually appropriate” instrument to deal with 
Iraq? If so, why would the same not be true for 1945 Japan? The difficul-
ty is thus apparent. Context can slip all too easily into pretext given the 
lack of any sort of guiding standards to understand when regime change 
might be acceptable as part of an “intrinsically lawful action” (whether it 
be war against Iraq or Japan) and when it might not. 
Moreover, an approach that permits regime change as part of lawful 
action says little about the nature of the resulting regime. In other words, 
regime change as concerns Nazi Germany, the theory might run, was 
warranted in light of the unprecedented atrocities it had committed and 
the foreign invasions in which it had engaged. Yet, on what basis, other 
than an impassioned and unapologetic commitment to democratic rule, 
could the resulting, emerging, democratic state of West Germany, im-
posed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, be consid-
ered normatively superior to the Soviet satellite state of East Germany, 
imposed by the Soviet Union?
136
 
Again, the passionate democrat has no such qualms. Those trans-
formations that are democratic and undertaken with broad public support 
(either immediately or subsequently manifested) belong within the cate-
gory of democratic transformation and occupy the sacred space. Those 
transformations that do not do so, regardless of how the transformation 
was achieved or by whom, cannot be similarly regarded. The distinction 
seems altogether more natural to those of us committed to the realization 
of the principle of democratic rule than the fruitless search for “intrinsi-
cally lawful action[s]” and “contextually appropriate instrument[s]” for 
them.
137
 
IV. LIBYA AND THE REALITIES OF THE EXTERNAL INTERVENTION 
While the ideas outlined herein may appear to some to be extreme 
respecting the causes and nature of external intervention, they are, I 
would submit, in some respects reflective of existing American policy in 
deed if not quite in word. As such, what is required is not so much some 
sort of grand change in policy, but rather an attitudinal shift in favor of 
the externally imposed democratic revolution. The problem, to state the 
matter forthrightly, is not so much that we are doing the wrong things, 
but that we obfuscate respecting our actions. In addition to having the 
benefit of meaning what we say, a more honest approach respecting ex-
ternal intervention and external imposition will also permit us to advance 
  
 135. See ALLAWI, supra note 112, at 65 (describing the catastrophic effect of the sanctions). 
 136. Derek J. Vanderwood, The Korean Reconciliation Treaty and the German Basic Treaty: 
Comparable Foundations for Unification?, 2 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 411, 414 (1993). 
 137. Reisman, supra note 8, at 89. 
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our political values as periodic eruptions such as the Arab Spring arise 
from time to time and to assess the extent to which such values should be 
compromised by the hard realities of geopolitics. 
The recent upheavals in Libya demonstrate the extent to which the 
notion that “regime change” need be linked to some “intrinsically lawful 
action” has devolved into farce, and a new approach and new under-
standing is warranted. Libyans had for over forty years suffered under 
the cruel and brutal dictatorship of Moammar Al-Qaddafi, whose human 
rights record was a string of outrages, from disappearances to extrajudi-
cial executions to the routine use of torture.
138
 There was nothing resem-
bling public participation in government; in fact, political parties were 
banned.
139
 It was in this environment that the citizens of Benghazi, taking 
advantage of the popular uprisings throughout the region against Arab 
autocrats, poured out onto the streets in February of 2011 demanding 
their right to alter or abolish the tyranny in which they had lived since 
1969.
140
 
Certainly President Obama articulated a defensible position that 
there was a desperate need to intervene to prevent a humanitarian disas-
ter that was alarming, if not close to Rwanda in its scale, when Qaddafi’s 
forces began to consolidate control over all of Libya following that initial 
popular uprising.
141
 That the Security Council repeated the same humani-
tarian intervention mantra in its authorization of force was certainly help-
ful in reinforcing that NATO had undertaken an “intrinsically lawful” 
action.
142
 When the Arab League repeated the call on similar grounds, 
this may have added even greater legitimacy.
143
 The case for humanitari-
an intervention at that point was thus plausible enough. 
Yet, it is plain that NATO and its member states exceeded such a 
mandate many times over. The humanitarian catastrophe in the form of 
an assault on Benghazi had passed within only a few weeks of the start of 
the intervention, and the conflict swiftly settled into a civil war that be-
came something of a stalemate, a term that even U.S. military officials 
  
 138. See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: LIBYA (2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136074.htm (describing the various human rights 
violations committed in Libya in 2009). 
 139. Id. at sec. 3. 
 140. See Anthony Shadid, Cycle of Suppression Rises in Libya and Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 2011, at A14. 
 141. Feller, supra note 1 (“[W]e saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if 
we waited one more day, Benghazi—a city nearly the size of Charlotte—could suffer a massacre that 
would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our 
national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen.”). 
 142. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 16. 
 143. Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over Libya, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at A1.  
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did not hesitate to use.
144
 One could readily have imagined at that point 
not so much an effort to remove Qaddafi but instead a narrowly circum-
scribed attempt to create a “safe haven” in Benghazi and to ensure that 
Qaddafi was not in a position to threaten a second assault. This is pre-
cisely what the United States had done vis-a-vis Iraq’s Kurdish region 
following its uprising in 1991.
145
  
However, this was hardly what was done in Libya. Admittedly, for 
some number of days, the rhetoric remained fixed on the principle of 
protecting civilian life, with NATO commanders insisting that they were 
not the air wing of the rebel force.
146
 But this ruse became increasingly 
difficult to sustain as NATO began to train and organize rebel forces,
147
 
as over $1 billion in aid was collected to assist the rebels,
148
 and subse-
quently, in the middle of the stalemate, the United States recognized the 
rebel leadership as the governing authority of Libya and gave it access to 
Libyan frozen assets worth $33 billion.
149
 Even after the rebels cemented 
control of Libya’s capital, airstrikes continued as the rebels pursued 
pockets of resistance in parts of the country loyal to Qaddafi.
150
 That this 
could have anything to do with civilian protection was preposterous.  
Wisely, given these developments, the rhetoric respecting humani-
tarian intervention began to recede within weeks of the intervention and 
abated nearly entirely by its end. The matter was by then described more 
forthrightly. Two sides to a conflict had been drawn into stalemate, and 
NATO had plainly thrown its weight behind the side that appeared to 
represent the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people. Or, to quote 
Germany’s Foreign Minister upon the decision by that nation to recog-
nize Libya’s rebels (the Transitional National Council) as its legitimate 
government, “[t]he Transitional Council is the legitimate representation 
  
 144. Adrian Blomfield, Libya: John McCain Calls on U.S. to Recognise Rebel Leadership, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 22, 2011, 7:37 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/africaandindianocean/libya/8469027/Libya-John-McCain-calls-on-US-to-recognise-rebel-
leadership.html (quoting Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Libya was 
moving towards a “stalemate”). 
 145. See FAROUK-SLUGLETT & SLUGLETT, supra note 129, at 294–95 (describing the Kurdish 
autonomous region after the First Gulf War). 
 146. Edward Cody & Leila Fadel, NATO Grudgingly Expresses Regret for Strike That Killed 
Libyan Rebels, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2011, at A10 (quoting Deputy Commander of NATO opera-
tions in Libya, Rear Adm. Russell Harding, as indicating that “I have to be frank and say it is not for 
us, trying to protect civilians, to improve communications with rebel forces”). 
 147. C.J. Chivers, Inferior Arms Hobble Rebels in Libya War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at 
A1. 
 148. Paul Richter, Panetta Sees Extremism Risk in Libya Rebel Panel, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 
2011, at A7. 
 149. See William Wan & William Booth, Libyan Rebels Given Full U.S. Recognition, WASH. 
POST, July 16, 2011, at A9. 
 150. Rod Nordland, Waiting Game as Talks Proceed Near a Holdout Town in Libya, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2011, at A14. 
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of the Libyan people. . . . With this council, we want to support the build-
ing of a democratic and law-abiding Libya.”151 
Thus, ultimately, NATO support for the rebels’ cause was a crucial 
element in their victory,
152
 one that would have been unimaginable not 
only if NATO had elected to refrain from its initial airstrikes, but also if 
NATO had truly attempted to circumscribe its mission in any reasonable 
fashion to avoiding humanitarian disaster. If, by contrast, we assume that 
the Libyan rebels were not democratic in impulse and action but instead 
unabashed religious fanatics along the lines of the Taliban in Afghanistan 
in the manner that Colonel Qaddafi suggested on repeated occasions,
153
 it 
is hard to imagine NATO or any member state within it would have re-
acted similarly, nor would any committed democrat have urged them to 
do so. In such a case, “responsibility to protect” would almost certainly 
have led to a very limited set of strikes to avoid civilian massacre but 
certainly not to replace Qaddafi’s regime, which had tempered its earlier 
extremist tendencies, with one broadly sympathetic to Al Qaeda. 
What NATO sought, in other words, was a democratic transfor-
mation. What it did was act as agent, or co-agent in any event, to that 
transformation. It is true that in Libya (as opposed to Iraq or Japan) it 
was the people who rose up first and NATO who came to their aid there-
after. Yet this does absolutely nothing to derogate from the fact that there 
was an external intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state, and that 
intervention, beyond its earliest phases, was directed not at “protecting 
civilians,” but at democratic transformation. 
To deflect this discussion through references to responsibilities to 
protect and humanitarian intervention is quite deleterious for a number of 
reasons. First of all, it requires nations to obfuscate respecting the nature 
of their intervention, which of course can lead to confusion respecting its 
ultimate aims. Qaddafi insists preposterously that NATO’s ambitions 
were colonial.
154
 It is helpful when confronting such nonsense to respond 
  
 151. Judy Dempsey, Germany Officially Recognizes Libyan Rebel Government, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 2011, at A10; see also Oliver Wright, Three Days to Get Out of the UK—Hague Expels 
Libyan Embassy Staff, THE INDEPENDENT (July 28, 2011), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/three-days-to-get-out-of-the-uk-ndash-hague-expels-
libyan-embassy-staff-2327278.html (quoting the U.K. Foreign Secretary, upon British recognition of 
the Transitional National Council, as suggesting that “[t]hrough its actions, the National Transitional 
Council has shown its commitment to a more open and democratic Libya”). 
 152. By March 11 of 2011, only weeks into the Libya uprising, it was clear that in the absence 
of external military intervention, the rebels in Benghazi would be extinguished by the better armed 
and trained Qaddafi forces. See Anthony Shadid, Momentum Shift as Libyan Rebels Flee an Oil 
Town, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at A1. 
 153. Respecting Col. Qaddafi’s descriptions, see Richard Spencer, I Am Like the Queen, Says 
Gaddafi in Plea to People, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 25, 2011, at 16–17 (quoting Qaddafi as 
saying, “It is obvious now that this issue is run by al-Qaeda. . . . Those armed youngsters, our chil-
dren, are incited by people who are wanted by America and the Western world.”). 
 154. Dan Murphy, Qaddafi Issues Threats: ‘Let Libya Burn’, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0901/Qaddafi-issues-threats-
Let-Libya-burn. 
File: Hamoudi_To_Darby Created on: 11/17/2012 4:07:00 PM Last Printed: 11/18/2012 9:55:00 PM 
2012] ARAB SPRING 733 
 
with what one’s true aims are as they concern regime change (namely, 
democratic transformation), and why they are legitimate, rather than to 
obfuscate in turn by claiming the aim of protecting civilians even when 
the actions are clearly not directed in such a fashion.  
But more importantly, the honest approach permits the recapture of 
the sacred ground for democratic transformation. It permits the United 
States to establish and proclaim clearly its values, and explain when it 
might be derogating from them and why. This is to say, Bahrain’s demo-
cratic protestors were no less deserving of support from any committed 
proponent of democracy than those of Libya. Once we concede, as we 
must, that NATO’s actions subsequent to its lifting the siege of Benghazi 
had nothing to do with humanitarian protection and everything to do with 
democracy promotion, then we must concede that Bahrain’s restive dem-
ocrats were normatively entitled to the same support, against a heartless 
tyrant whose security forces think nothing of shooting children, detaining 
human rights activists, and imprisoning doctors who tend to the wound-
ed.
155
 It may be that geopolitical considerations counsel against interven-
tion, and that the United States and its NATO allies may not be in any 
sort of position to intervene to impose democracy wherever the ground 
seems suitably fertile. But let us at least admit to ourselves that this is a 
compromise to principle rather than its realization and that our commit-
ments, our sympathies, our ideals, and our vision lie with the democratic 
revolutionaries and not with their opponents. Let us, if we can do nothing 
else, at least grant to the world’s aspiring and repressed democrats their 
sacred space, let us honor them properly with our own romantic sympa-
thies with their noble endeavor even if we must, distastefully and in light 
of the harsh realities of the world, deal with the tyrants who repress them 
as if they were legitimate. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that attempts to categorize revolutions, indeed 
radical political transformations generally, along neutral process-based 
lines obscure our romantic commitment to them and deny them the sa-
cred space to which they are entitled. My own effort is only to expand on 
this concept. I want to suggest that our commitment to the transformation 
must be precisely the same if the transformation sought is radical reform 
or revolution, achieved through deep structural legal change or through 
adherence to principles of legality, as these are all but formal procedural 
niceties that have little to do with the result that is sought by those de-
manding change. Indeed, our commitment to the transformation should 
also be unaltered if achieved with the support, or even the instigation, of 
an external power with subsequent popular endorsement or by a domestic 
  
 155. For a more detailed account of the human rights atrocities to which the people of Bahrain 
have been subjected, see sources cited supra note 10. 
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force, friendly monarch or professional military, acting with popular 
support. In the end, what is at stake is government of, for, and by the 
people. How it is achieved, and by whom in the first instance, is of little 
consequence.  
 
